Thursday, December 26, 2013

Should France Have Protected Bangui Against Seleka?

Bernard Lugan thinks that France should have intervened and protected Bangui a year ago. Is this so?

While on the one hand playing the role of regional leader in stabilising the Central African Republic, but on the other hand supporting Seleka to get rid of a Tchad rebel group that tried to topple him in 2008, Tchad's president Idriss Déby was playing a game we all know all to well from the war in Congo.

And France, which has studied it's previous mistakes in Rwada very well, was determined to avoid the 1994 scenario in Rwanda.

Instead of defending Bangui, France decided to play the diplomatic game first. Which reminds of what happened after the fall of Goma in 2012.

A year later we are now seeing a similar scenario, which was tested in Goma (& Kivu), play out in Bangui and the Central African Republic.

Same mandate, same players involved.

It's quite surprising Bernard Lugan, an expert on the French role in Rwanda, would even think of proposing a similar scenario to French politics in Bangui.

What we have in Bangui is no longer the French protecting a dictator, but a Chapter 7 mandated MISCA force, supported by France, taking on all rebel groups.

A strategy tested in Kivu and supported by the United States, South Africa and the United Nations Security Council.

Monday, December 23, 2013

Jacob Zuma's Anti-Populist Foreign Policy

The interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and subsequently the Central African Republic both illustrate the emergence of the alignment of the foreign policy of France, South Africa and the United States.

Jacob Zuma's foreign policy is obviously not the result of sudden inspiration, but is built on a long history since his involvement in, at least, the Burundi peace process. 

It's therefore quite surprising to see so many commentators claim that Zuma is focused less on human rights and more on economic interests. Dr Paul-Simon Handy in october:
'Africa’s foreign policy priorities are so weak under President Zuma as to be almost impossible to define.'
  MAMPHELA RAMPHELE in july:
'SOUTH African foreign policy under the ANC government over the past years has not only been characterised by a moral decline, it has also failed to keep pace with the dynamic and rapidly evolving international environment.' 
France 24 journalist Ebba Kalondo makes similar claims in a recent video on South African foreign policy.

Is there a shift in South African foreign policy since Zuma. And if so, what is it? The debates on Zuma's involvement in Central Africa and Congo among South African journalists and opposition parties will not help us much, I'm affraid.

The July 2009 article 'A New Foreign Policy for Jacob Zuma's South Africa' by Xolela Mangcu on the other hand, has a lot of valuable information on what is really going on. For example he quotes Adekeya Adebajo who said this:
'South Africa spent a great deal of its time at the United Nations in “unnecessary spats” with the superpowers over Myanmar, Iran, North Korea etc which were of no direct concern to South Africa. Adebayo counsels that “South Africa can have only influence and respect abroad if its leadership is accepted on its own continent.'
Xolela Mangcu prediction in 2009 of a 're-orientation towards a more modest but focused role' seems confirmed in Zuma's engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.

The endgame in the DRC against Rwanda/Uganda backed m23 in which Zuma played a central role should be placed in the context of Obama's Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006

Did Rwanda and Uganda underestimate Jacob Zuma's strategic insight?

October 14th, during Francois Hollande's visit, Jacob Zuma unveiled another cornerstone of  South Africa's modest and focused foreign policy when he said:
'foreign troops need to intervene urgently in the Central African Republic because security is deteriorating and the government isn’t prepared to hold elections on schedule.'

A pragmatic, anti-populist(!), approach aimed at solving problems instead of pointing fingers. This offcourse sends a very strong message towards the anti-French populists (mostly UK and German pundits) and the anti-west 'panafricanists'. The populist opposition against his foreign policy from the Democratic Alliance concerning the Central African intervention might well help Jacob Zuma attract segments of the former National Party vote.

Jacob Zuma's emerging anti-populist foreign policy has sofar been met with little enthousiasm. It's offcourse still in it's early stages, but the consequences of this shift away from populism will obviously have it's impact on countries like Zimbabwe as well. And Zuma seems to hesitate to shout this new anti-populist message from the rooftops as well. At least, that's how I interpret his absence at the summit in Paris.

But Francois Hollande has understood and I expect that it's only a matter of time and European leaders with less affinity with African politics, like Angela Merkel, will come around. Let's hope Germany's journalists will start to see beyond the usual stereotypes of French foreign involvement in Africa.

What surprises me at this point is the fierce hostility towards France among UK journalists, analysts and politicians. The UK has strong affinity with Africa and should know better. Disappointing.

At least the United States of America is picking up the positive signals and showing enthousiasm in working with both Zuma and Hollande in forging a way forward in Africa, away from the stereotypes and populisms of the past.

I wonder if John Kerry's French connection has anything to do with this postive American engagement.

All this puts the 2012 campaign for Dlamini-Zuma 'couched as a crusade against "French imperialism" in a rather akward light. Would she have won against Jean Ping if Jacob Zuma had been working this closely together with France at the time? Hard to say.

Jacob Zuma's 'balancing act' or two-step foreign policy might actually have been so good that it has fooled both his African partners and the West. This could explain his absence in Paris. He prefers to keep his cards close to his chest.

Monday, December 2, 2013

Zuma's Role In Congo & The Central African Republic



Still trying to figure out, as so many others I suppose, why intervention in CAR went into high gear just a few weeks ago. Still believe it has something to do with South Africa & Tanzania's involvement in Congo.

In october Francois Hollande paid a visit to Jacob Zuma and planned the conference that will take place in Paris in a few days.

In the meantime the #m23 has been defeated by the Congolese army with the help of the South African army. Jacob Zuma visited Kinshasa the day the crisis ended to send a clear message to foreign nations that backed #m23.

The role of the Burundian army in Somalia, Mali and now the Central African Republic indicates a strategic alliance is emerging between the South African and the French African blocks inside the African Union.

Burundi indicated it's readiness to send troops to the Central African Republic in july.